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Tilikidjiev, Nikolay and collective. Social Stratification and Inequality. SUMMARIES SOCIAL STRATIFICATION: ITS CHARACTER AND A WAY OF MEASURING NIKOLAI TILKIDJIEV (Summary) p. 217-231 In Bulgarian sociology today the status of the theory of social stratification - an integral part of Western sociological knowledge - is, to say the least, somewhat unnatural. It is both existent and non-existent... On the one hand, the Marxist-Leninist theory of classes and class struggle, a number of publications on the social stratification of the former totalitarian society were produced in the pre-1989 years in which (regardless of the inevitable ideological jargon) the problems of social inequality were given an adequate professional examination. Regardless of their indisputable contributions and along with some controversial findings of theirs, these works bear the characteristic features of the period, being an emanation of a previous reality and mode of theorising. Hence the need for a reestimation and rethinking of the recently dominant methodological framework, research methods and paradigms. This need is the result of the new political, social and scientific realities in society. On the other hand, mainly because of political and ideological considerations, the serious works on the problems of social stratification were usually presented by their authors as something completely different from the Western-style social stratification studies. Undoubtedly, autocensorship was one of the most effective universal mechanisms of the totalitarian society, quite efficient at regulating the sociological community too. This is something I could (in the 1980-1989 period) easily see in my own unformal contacts with prominent students of social stratification, such as Ovsey Shkaratan, Leonid Gordon, Tatyana Zaslavskaya, Manfred Lotsch, Edmund Wnuk-Lypinski, Kaziemerz Slomczinski, Tamas Kolosi. This artificially created "parallelism" - the parallel approaches to the problems of "social and class structure" and "social stratification" - had a serious negative impact on sociological research, the consequences of which are still felt. The task we face now is not the substitution of the aforementioned terms with the term "social stratification". What we have to accomplish is the overall conceptual rehabilitation of the theoretical and methodological instruments of the social stratification studies, the reconstruction and emancipation of the stratification problems in their original and full-bodied scientific form as well as the further development of the field as an inseparable part of sociological knowledge. Such a broad and ambitious research program can be accomplished only within a long period of time. Furthermore, there can be different approaches to the realisation of the program. The present work aims at presenting a theoretical and practical analysis of the most essential methodological problems in the field of social stratification studies. A few reservations of ours must be made known at the beginning of the analysis. In general every research is modified by the objective dynamics of the stratification processes. The subjects of the stratification picture have not crystallised into anything stable and the restructuring of inequality has reached different degrees. More particularly, not all significant social categories and strata have been covered by representative research. First of all a part of the processes and mechanisms of stratification in our countries are imperceptible, unapproachable and elusive for common concrete empirical registration and proof. I am referring to those processes that are partially or entirely lacking in social legitimity. The relative portion of people included in this sphere of activity may not be very large, but to ignore their social significance would spoil our stratification analysis and picture, make it one-sided, not true to life. These new millionaires (in dollars) have all emerged as parasites on the body of state property, on the concealed, transformed or exported capitals of the country. (For example, by the experts estimation only during the last two years - 1995 and 1996 - there have been exported in this way from a country a small as Bulgaria more than one billion and five hundred million dollars. And about 16 billion dollars since 1985.) There are at least four such categories of nouveau riche: 1) those who have amassed wealth through laundering money; 2) the "red capitalists"; 3) the new corrupted politicians and state officials; 4) the unofficial lobbies, pressure groups of various kinds, including those based on ethnic, religious, secret service affiliations. Such categories are all the more difficult to identify as they have partially merged, are often symbiotically combined. Within this context - it is a great challenge to sociologists at the end of the 20th century, both in the East and the West, to investigate, understand and explain the correlations between "formal, official, undisguised" stratification and "informal, unofficial, hidden" stratification. Another difficulty in the adequate reflection of social stratification is the common exclusion from samples of six other social categories which directly or indirectly affect the concrete forms and degrees of inequality: soldiers, students, ailing or handicapped people, labour migrants, risk groups and strategic, top elite. Hence the body of stratification proves not only "crippled" but also "beheaded". What then we are studying and analysing by our research, especially the representative kind of research? Are we achieving a full adequate picture of the reality of stratification?... V/S SOCIAL STRATIFICATION DEBATE It must be stressed in concluding this concise review of the argument on "the class structure v/s social stratification" dilemma that the confrontation between the two approaches can be removed by realising that both class and non-class differentiation are forms of social stratification. There's a genetic connection and propinquity between the two which explains their co-existence and interaction, respectively, their partial overlapping. Generalizing this brief outline of the "class structure" vs. "social stratification" debate I will note that this opposition, current in literature, can be overcome by correcting three basic theoretical and methodical sources of misunderstanding: 1) An unjustified parallelism in the interpretation of relations between the class and the stratification aspect, treating them as two parallel, independent realities. In practice one is aform of manifestation of the other (classes are basic "strata", a basic observable form of stratification, of social stratal differentiation). Hence the class approach is a kind, a variant of the stratification approach. Class analyses of Marx, Weber, Dahrendorf, Goldthorpe etc. are nothing but a variant of the basic social stratification of society and, hence - an inseparable part of stratification theories. 2) An unjustified assumption that Marx's specific historical-conflict approach is a general theory of classes. Marx's theoretical scheme has explanatory value when applied to societies going through acute social, economic and political crises, societies in a period of transition and transformation. The dichotomy, polar opposition, conflict between the governing and the subordinated groups - the main level of conflict for Pareto as well - are typical of such periods (e.g. during the decline of European feudalism, during the emergence of the "proletariat", of the hired labour force as opposed to capitalists in the 19th cent., during the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917, during the decline of the East European type of socialism, the period (1985 to 1989) of unmasking the opposition between the nomenclature and the mass of subordinated employees, intellectuals and workers etc.). In the other periods of relative stability of social structures this explanatory scheme is inapplicable. At best we could claim that this class dichotomy is latent, lies somehow concealed (comparably to Kant's notion of "Ding an Sich") and comes to the surface only in such periods of crisis (is revealed as "Ding fur Sich"). By analogy with Kant Marx call the two forms "a class in itself" and "a class for itself", and in the latter form what is specially important is for individuals to realise there are common class interests, i. e. to form self-consciousness as a class (the object of George Lukacz's special analysis). the existence of the "nomenclature" as a concealed form of class was noticed by Nikolai Berdyaev, George Orwell, Milovan Djilas ( "the new class") and later by Mikhail Voslenski, but it surfaced as an overt subject and factor in the East European countries only as late as the end of the 1980s. Now this is the most significant difference between Marx's and Weber's class approach. Weber's classical contribution is both in grounding the multidimensional approach (combining the economic with the political and cultural aspects), and in giving a general theoretical analysis of stratification in society not in the latter's transitional states but as something relatively stable. In this sense Weber was followed by Ralf Dahrendorf, Theodor Geiger ( I believe this is why Geiger talks about strata - Schichten - not classes) and John Goldthorpe. 3) The insufficient clarification of the three different levels of social-group, stratal reality (the macro, meso and micro levels) that was mentioned previously. In the literature on the topicthey tend to be confused. There are at least three types of conceptions of stratification, of three different orders: a strictly hierarchic one (starting from the upper class or the elite, passing through the middle and going to the lower class in various variants) and the classifications of the socio-economic categories, beginning with W. Lloyd Warner and Otis Dudley Duncan, including the famous EGP and reaching the new versions of Goldthorpe. The latest versions, although they use the term "class", actually refer to the meso -, not the macro-level. The exact term in this case should be "socio-economic categories". Understandably the different variants of classification used by Goldthorpe and his colleagues in the 1970s, as well as the corresponding East European ones designed at the same time by O. Shkaratan, L. Gordon et al., do not cover the whole social stratification, but only the economically active part (the occupational categories). If strictly applied to Bulgaria in 1997, they would determine the status of about 55% of the population. And it would be unjustified to assign their former social-economic status to categories such as pensioners, unemployed, students etc. (who have been such for over a year). SOCIAL STRATIFICATION The necessary preliminary steps to be made in order construct a scientific typology of the social strata (according to the theoretical basis): 1) Determination of the social status; 2) Hierarchization of substatuses; 3) Operationalization of substatuses; 4) Internal arrangement of empirical indicators; 5) The creation of an algorithm for the manual or computer coding and processing of the information collected. The observation of some extremely important methodological requirements is of crucial importance for the process of social groups classification. These requirements are: 1) sufficiency; 2) intensity; 3) hierarchic character; 4) dynamics. For the sake of brevity, I will enlist here only the basic indicators determining the social status. 1. SOCIAL STATUS PROPER (the group status proper of the separate individual - static aspect of the status): 1.1. Occupational status (economic status in occupational terms - important status dimensions such as one's real property and finances are deliberately excluded here): 1.2. Property status 1.3. Financial (income) status 1.4. Power status (institutional and political status inclusive) 1.5. Cultural status 1.6. Consumption status (life-style) 1.7. Residence status 1.8. Demographic status 2. STATUS DYNAMIC (Group reproduction, respectively, mobility): 2.1. Intergenergenerational mobility 2.2. Intragenerational mobility (Career; current group status) 2.3. Community stratification status (Status of the microenvironment; stratificational characteristic of one's milieu) 3. SUBJECTIVE STATUS 3.1. Status identification 3.2. Attitudes towards inequality and stratification 3.3. Subjective change (A Representative Survey within ISSP - July, 1997)
More detailed information see also in: Nikolai Tilkidjiev (1996): Social Stratification in Post-Communist Bulgaria, in: Bulgaria at the Crossroads, J.Coenen-Huther (ed.), Nova Science Publishers, Inc., New York, pp. 79-96. UNIVERSITY GRADUATES: THE SOCIAL REALITY AND THE VALIDITY OF TERMS IN STRATIFICATION ANALYSIS Svetla Koleva (Summary) How to define the intelligentsia as regards social stratification? What is its empirical correlate, its substance, its boundaries? Is the very designation "intelligentsia" a sociological term or rather an element of political-ideological speech? What are the relations between members of the intelligentsia and the category of people who are traditionally, but nevertheless imprecisely called "intellectuals"? Can the educational category "university graduates" resolve the problem of the obscure, mobile, vaguely delimited opposition "intellectuals-intelligentsia", and what would the results be for stratification analysis? In seeking a solution to part of these problems we are using the following research strategy: first, we clarify the nature and specifics of intellectuals and the intelligentsia, regarding them not as scientific constructs but as categories in a state of social reconstruction, i.e. whose nature and social profile are taking shape in the course of their social and historical genesis, and second, we propose an analysis of the concrete, spatio-temporally located educational stratum - specialists with a higher education in Bulgarian society from the 1960s to the 1990s; assuming that this is one of the possible courses for the adequate (meaning empirically verifiable), although restricted (as concerns the abundant variety of social traits to be found in reality) study of the social strata whose professional and social being is permanently related to the mind. Regardless of the social-historical transformations of the "people of thought and imagination", intellectual labour remains the constant objective, matter and means of their professional activity. This is the solid basis for all other characteristics which, in some cases bring them closer together, and in others draw them further apart, one in respect to the other and both of them together in respect to the other social strata. The cause for this lies in the fact that these characteristics, although connected to the specific quality of intellectual activities, are based on the involvement of intellectuals and the intelligentsia in the constant differentiation of professional, qualificational, branch, power and organizational structures. Thus a professor is both a teacher and a researcher, a composer can also be a performer, a surgeon or engineer can also be leading scientists in their fields. In other words, the frequently stressed difference between intellectuals as creators of new knowledge, ideas, scientific and artistic values and the intelligentsia as consumers who practically apply the intellectual products of others (Lipset, 1991: 364-365), although it refers to the nature and contents of the work, actually has a social basis. The increasing division of labour, the growing specialization of knowledge and the ever greater need for acquiring it, lead to the gradual parting of creativity and repetition, of innovation and convention, their separate entrenchment in specific social-professional statuses. These statuses are unequal in their position in the work system and in their professional prestige. If we add the income level, autonomy in the organization of labour, the quantity and quality of social capital (in the sense of Bourdieu) that status provides, the professional situation of intellectuals and intelligentsia becomes even more complex and equivocal. The analysis of Bulgarian specialists with a higher education in the period 1960-1989 shows them to be a new social formation, different from the intelligentsia of the1930-40s, which was repressed by the Party after the communist state was established. From the late 1940s to the early 1950s the Bulgarian intelligentsia lived in conditions where its formation and development was programmed, oriented, administrated to a great degree by the political power of the Communist Party. The low income of specialists with a higher education and the pressure of daily economic conditions since the late 1980s gradually wore away the social prestige of a higher education and the latter has fallen behind in the competition with more instrumental and pragmatic value. Taken in its totality, these factors mould Bulgarian specialists-graduates as a specific social group<1> with the following characteristics<2>: - first, their cultural capital, i. e. their education, is highest of those of all other groups and strata. What is more, by 1986 3,65% of higher graduates also had scientific degrees<3> , and in the late 80s the relative proportion of scientists in the general structure of the Bulgarian population was considerably higher than in countries like Japan, USA, West Germany, Sweden, Holland<4> etc. - second, its economic capital is lower than that of other educational strata; - third, as concerns social capital, in the absence of empirical studies, we can only suppose it to be relatively limited, since the specifics of cultural capital of this groups and the volume of its economic capital cannot compete with the economic means and pragmatic skills of other educational strata involved in the "parallel economy"; - fourth, its symbolic capital expressed in social prestige and respect, is decreasing and ceases to be a motivating force for social-professional orientation of young people. So by the end of the 1980s Bulgarian specialists with higher education proved to be bearers of a significant cultural capital alone, and were being seriously tried by circumstances. After the political events of November 1989 two sets of processes have affected the professional and social fate of specialists-higher graduates. The first set of processes is closely related to the structural economic reform oriented to building the institutions of private property and a free market. The past eight years of reforms in Bulgarian economy have resulted in: a) a serious drop in production, b) a uniquely intense reduction of working places, an exponential growth of unemployment, c) a sharp reduction of budget aid for the development of science, education, health care, culture, blocking the activity of these spheres which are closely connected with the training of specialists with a higher education. As concerns the labour-professional situation of the group under study these processes lead to a kind of "social invalidity". This is markedly expressed in the cases of unemployed specialists with higher educational and qualificational status. The most seriously affected are specialists with a technical education in the age group of 30 to 50 years since 1990s. Specialists-graduates prove to be the stratum in the education structure of Bulgarian society that finds it hardest to regain its position once marginalized on the labour market. As for employed higher graduates, "social invalidity" in their case is expressed mostly in their living standard. The people occupied in the state sector (more than half the higher graduates) are in the low levels of the income structure of Bulgarian society. What is more, owing to the budget deficit and the forthcoming reforms in administration, higher schools, research institutes etc., their salaries, main source of income, are not guaranteed. In view of this instability and dim professional outlook, the intension to emigrate gradually spreads among them. Various surveys have shown that this inclination is not typical of specialists-graduates alone. Their inclination to live and work abroad is neither more nor less than that of other educational-stratification groups (about10% of the Bulgarian population of age). What could have negative results for the development of the entire society is their willingness, due to the continuous economic crisis, to perform labour requiring low qualification and low educational level. Owing to their specific education, qualification, and education status scientists lead the way in the dangerous tendency of internal brain drain. The second set of processes that are significant for the development and reproduction of the highly educated strata are related to the sphere of higher education itself. The system is being reformed in connection with democratic social changes at large and is undergoing the following changes: The number of universities grew from 30 in 1989-1990 to 41 in 1995-1996 academic year<5>. During this period the number of students also increased by 90 076 people, which is 1,67 times<6>. The newly enrolled students for 1995/96 are 28 918 people more than in 1989/90, or nearly twice as many<7>. The number who graduated higher schools in 1995 (25 193 persons) were 35% more than those who graduated in 1989 (19 087)<8>. The only category among higher graduates which is decreasing both in absolute numbers and relatively is that of the scientific-research intelligentsia. After 1989 the number of research workers has consistently been decreasing, reaching a drop by 20 % at the end of 1995<9>. Staff reductions in the budget sphere, abolishing of scientific institutions, emigration, professional reorientation, changes in the sphere of labour activity are some of the processes leading to the slow but constant erosion of the Bulgarian scientific potential<10>. Setting aside the processes taking place in the Bulgarian professional community of scientists, the tendencies in other categories of higher graduates lead to the increase in the proportion of higher education in Bulgarian society by two points. We are confronted by an obvious paradox: under conditions of segmentation of the labour market, the demographic drop, the considerable wave of emigration, the absolute and relative proportion of specialists with a higher education is growing. What will the consequences of this process be for the socio-professional structure of Bulgarian society and its development potential? To what extent do the new graduates enlarge the intelligentsia and the intellectual life of Bulgarian society? In seeking the answers to these questions future research will help clarify the complex theoretic issues concerning the notional legitimation of social reality in stratification analysis. OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION Tsocho Zlatkov (Summary) The "material" basis for the formation of social-groups has three levels: macrosocial groups, social-professional groups and groups of related professions. These levels are the result of the interaction of the three levels in the nature of labour and production relations. While the groups of related professions are a sublevel of social-professional structure, the latter is more than a concrete formation of macrosocial groups but embraces a wider range pf phenomena. Some social-professional groups do not fit into any of the macrosocial groups, for the reason that some of their characteristics correspond to the criteria of one group, others to those of another. On the other hand they do not have the volume and weight of the macrosocial groups and hence should not be placed along side of them. These are essentially three kinds of quasi-groups and their chances of becoming social strata are different (which does not exclude that some of them could be such already). Macrosocial groups are progressively losing their role of objective basis of social strata because the internal solidity of their social situation is becoming increasingly disrupted; this tendency will increase as a result of the growing plurality of property forms and the general changes in society. So the attention of researchers should be aimed at social-professional structure and the structure of related, similar professions. In concretizing these structures it is necessary to establish all significant traits that differentiate them in their actual subordination, without establishing their importance a priori. This is a basic condition for getting to the real groups. In order to determine the set of characteristics defining the social position of social-group inidividuals and compare them, we must first of all determine the empirical existence of these subjects. 'There are two ways of working out the typology of social-group subjects. The first is to apply the previously devised social-group classification when conducting a survey (such is the case in all of our surveys); the second is to determine the groups by referring to empirical data on a number of parametres of social position. The first approach is on the whole prevalent in contemporary sociology. It can be effected in a number of ways. The least reliable course is through self-identification of respondents - having the person choose one of the names of social groups offered by researchers, or allowing him to think up a name by himself on the basis of his own knowledge, views and attitudes regarding society. Such a study gives information about the superstructural dimensions of social differentiation, but should not be used in making judgements as to the objective social-groups situation of the persons. The second method requires that the interviewers assign the respondents to the social groups defined in the typology that the researchers have provided. This is still a very widely used method but has serious short-comings: 1. Not all interviewers have knowledge of sociology; 2. The interviewers have different educational backgrounds and interpret the criteria in various ways; 3. The increased number and dispersion of interviewers inevitably leads to an increased number of random mistakes, and sometimes to conscious deformation. So in practice it is difficult (except in certain small-scale studies) for the interviewers to achieve the uniform and precise social group definition of the persons under study. The third way of using the ready-made technologies is by collecting information according to a set of parametres (discussed below) regarding the individual's social position. This makes it possible to determine the social group of the person, but it is usually the researchers who do it. Here as well the possible courses are two. One is to use a preliminary algorithm. The second way is more open and creative: the combining and generalizing of information on the respective sets of indicators is performed by one or more experts. This is becoming a prevalent method and is preferred by researchers. The draw-back of using algorithms under conditions such as ours is that preliminary scales and classifications of professions are lacking. The second basic approach for determining the social-group structure of a given totality consists in using a set of traits coming, so to speak, from"below" without using a preliminary classification. This is done by generalizing the primary information coming from a set of indicators in applying formal mathematical methods of automatic classification, such as factoral analysis, methods for identifying images (taxonomy, cluster analysis) etc. Maya Keliya (Summary) The fact that so far the agrarian reform remains unaccomplished has a decisive impact on the stratification processes in the Bulgarian village. These processes are a result, on one hand, of the collapse of communism and the beginning changes. On the other hand the social stratification inherited from the totalitarian regime, the positions of classes, strata and groups , their respective resources, has a strong impact as well. As a result the status of all social groups and strata related to agriculture has changed. Some of them have moved to a higher position according to certain indicators such as income and consumption, while others have moved downwards. Still others, such as the former Party nomenklatura, have changed their status resources. They have lost their political position and privileges but use past power resources and privileges in order to transform and accumulate property and capitals and to legitimate their new economic status. Data show that the farmer class is in process of formation although such people are not yet legitimate owners of the lands they cultivate. They rely heavily on and are economically subjected to state supply, purchasing etc. organizations, and depend on the services of agricultural cooperatives which are practically run by the state. On the other hand they depend on nonstate organizations that hold a monopoly and dictate economic conditions to producers. These organizations take advantage of the institutional and market vacuum to the prejudice of producers and consumers. The chaotic legislation and regulation maintained by state employees consolidates their position as monopolists. As a result of the artificially low purchase prices the agricultural producers not only are not stimulated to increase production but, moreover, are practically being robbed and can barely maintain their production level. A 1993 survey on private farms shows that 12.3% of the farmers do not wish to work in private agriculture in future. For 30% of those who prefer not to work in private farming the main reason for their option is the unfavourable economic situation. The lack of laws and normative documents promoting the development of private agriculture is the cause pointed to by 24% of those unwilling to continue in the private farming sector. Another 24% point out they have serious financial problems. 12% are of the opinion that there are still no institutions and organizations that would help private farms in getting supplies, selling their produce, and receiving agricultural services. Those interviewed say they have two possibilities for realizing their production. One is to sell it themselves, the other is to use monopolistic purchasing organizations as go-betweens, organizations which can dictate conditions. All of these circumstances are obstacles to the economic stability of the farmer class. In totalitarian society the rural class is delimited by the following status characteristics: employment, occupation and place of residence. The official statistics of the time assigned both agricultural workers and specialists occupied in the sphere of services and management in the agrarian sector to the general group of agricultural workers. Outside this classification remained the nomenklatura, defined in general as "governing", which obscures the difference between its real power resources and those of other categories pertaining to the sphere of management, such as professionals and managers. The latter perform functions of leadership in the organization and management of agrarian production and labour, but do not dispose of the potential to make the kinds of decisions for which the nomenklatura was once empowered. The possibilities for working on the private farm, for producing and selling the produce, creates and reproduces another type of inequality. Those who, for some reasons, can produce more and sell on the market, get considerable added income.Even in totalitarian times there were certain villages known for producing out-of-season vegetables and fruits, in demand on the market, and such producers were known as "greenhouse millionaires". The first kind of inequality is based on the privileges of the nomenklatura and has noneconomic basis but carries definite material benefits. While the second depends on labour, i.e. has an economic origin. Taking into account the particular social-economic processes in villages today, we can consider the following to be significant indicators of the positions of people employed in agriculture: the amount of property owned, both that meant for production and for consumption; income of any sort (monetary or in kind), regardless of its origin (wages, investments, social security); employment (full-time and/or part-time, in the various sectors of economy: state, private, cooperative, and in various economic branches); occupation; power : one's position in respect to power structures. After the beginning of the transition the agrarian economic activity can be realized in several forms: by realizing agrarian property; through labour; by realizing both labour and property in the same person, namely in cases of self-employed individuals. Most of the people occupied in agriculture in our country are self-employed. This fact has an important impact on the reproduction and mobility of the farmer class. As a rule the self-employed transmit the property of the land to their children which is a factor determining to a great degree the economic activity of agrarian inheritors. This circumstance acquires added importance in periods of economic crisis and high unemployment when a large part of the population is faced with the problem of survival. Due to the particularities of social-economic development and labour legislation in Bulgaria, the above-mentioned distinction is very conditional. Often the income derived from the "main" place of employment is smaller than that coming from the "additional" ones. The social group of those basically employed in agriculture includes: households living in villages and employed in agriculture. They can be employed either basically and full-time or part-time and additionally in the agrarian sector. In order to fall within this group the greater part of their income should be of agrarian origin, derived from agrarian labour, production or property. These are the so-called full-time farmers; households living in cities but obtaining the greater part of thier income through full-time or part-time occupation in agriculture or through realization of land property. This is the group of part-time farmers, type I. The social group of those additionally employed in agricultural economic activity can be either peasants or city-dwellers whose income is mostly of non-agrarian origin, i.e. part-time farmers type II. With reference to the position in agricultural management several categories of specialists and managers can be distinguished. Each disposes of some power resources. For certain categories of specialists and managers these resources are limited to decision-making regarding the technological organization of agrarian production. Others, according to their position in the hierarchy, have various ranges of economic power exercised in respect to the provisioning, sale, financing and crediting of agriculture. Before the changes began agrarian specialists and managers were concentrated in the former agricultural cooperatives; the latter were both agrarian producers and providers of various agricultural services. After the start of the transition part of these people were employed in the new agricultural cooperatives, others formed firms for agricultural services. Before the changes the nomenklatura were the ones to have the greatest power resources in agriculture, as in all social spheres. They were subsequently able to transform political power into economic by using their accumulated social capital. In most cases the former nomenklatura members created firms for agrarian services, agrarian credit banks etc. and continued to hold key power positions in the agrarian sector. This fact is hard to capture through empirical observation, because in most cases the leading figures in these firms, banks etc. are not nomenklatura members themselves, but family relations or close relatives of the former nomenklatura. Of course other social groups also have great power resources in agriculture. Those who have grown rich through their labour on the personal farm can use the financial means accumulated over the years, their market positions and network of formal and informal contacts to buy the necessary means for production (technology, inventory, constructions, stock etc.) at low, pre-inflation prices. Some other representatives of the new political elite and state employees who have taken the place of the previous nomenklatura also profit from their new social and political position. Over the last fifty years the most significant source of income for the Bulgarian households, both urban and rural, was the work salary. Under the conditions of centralized state planning of the economy practically the only form of economic activity open to people was hired labour, and in most cases the state was the employer. Data of studies of the budget of households during the last ten years show a tendency to yearly growth of the absolute quantity of incomes, a result of the rapid inflation processes in the country. Household income growth is a result of the absolute growth of the work salary. But its relative part in the total income (i.e. the monetary income plus the value of the income in kind) tends to decrease. In the period 1980-92 the lowest salaries were those of people occupied in agriculture and forestry. Agrarian labour, as before, is still considered less prestigious than industrial work. Unlike industry, agriculture is not a priority for the market transition period any more than it was for socialist economy. That is why wages in the agrarian sector were and still are among the lowest in the country. The status of those employed in agriculture and those residing in villages is correspondingly lower that that of workers in the non-agrarian economic spheres and of city residents. Running a personal farm affects the budget revenues of both agrarian-occupied village dwellers and of city residents working in the nonagrarian branches of the economy. Data show that the relative share of these incomes are higher in the case of workers than for the social group of the employed and the intelligentsia. In the coming few years, with the advance of the land restitution process, however slow, we can expect that the importance of the personal farm as a source of income for Bulgarian households will grow. In general for the period 1985-1994 the incomes in kind have grown by 18% while the revenues from the private farms have increased by nearly 36 times. While their share in the structure of the general income of Bulgarian households was 21% at the start, it grew to 26% in 1994. This tendency manifests itself to various degrees in the various social groups. It is stronger in the case of agrarian workers and peasants than for the social group of employees and intelligentsia and for city residents. Part of the produce of the private farm is used for preserving meat, fruits and vegetables for domestic consumption. The so-called "jar economy" is among the traditional means for self-sustenance. On the other hand this kind of economy produces products for exchange in kind with relatives and friends living in the city. The latter for their part often help out their relations in the nearby villages with their labour in peak times of rural work. In this way , besides being a means for exchange in kind of labour and products, the personal farm and the related "jar economy" is important for the vitality of relations between kinfolk and friends. What is more, it is a form for "material" realization of these connections, for their becoming economic. The difference between the incomes of households of different social groups determines the inequality in their consumption. There is a general tendency in our country to shrinking of consumption for nearly all social groups. In 1991 the expenses of Bulgarian households for food were five times higher than in 1985, reaching 45% in 1994. Nevertheless the actual consumption of the basic food products has actually decreased in recent years. In these years the following tendencies are evident in the incomes, consumption and social-economic position of households occupied in agriculture: 1. The forms of agricultural activity of the households become more varied and extensive, which leads to corresponding changes in their social stratification position. Those occupied in the state sector still hold a priority,but the importance of labour on the private farm is growing . Simultaneously the orientation toward private farming is becoming stronger, thereby increasing the importance of the emerging farmer class. 2. The inequlity between the various social groups of households remain unchanged, and even grow considerably in the transition period. A strong intergroup mobility is evident: movement from certain social groups mentioned above to high income groups dealing in private economic activities and the contrariwise movement from all social groups to the low income groups. 3. It is typical for those who have begun and succeeded in private activities that they have definite resources and in most cases rely on the professional experience, knowledge, formal and informal relations and contacts acquired during their working years previous to the changes. Their resources can be related to previous and present positions in the power hierarchy. Or they could be due to profits from their private farms, from the field of informal economy or the land restitution. 4. The formation of a middle class of owners is hampered, and this undoubtedly aggravates the social and economic problems in the transition to a market economy. Dobrinka Kostova (Summary) The new elites and their economic and social manifestations are the subject of this chapter. They are forming the new class in the countries of Eastern Europe. The emergence of this class involves both individual and social identity change. The chapter also provides a baseline and interpretation of the existing sociological study work (available by the middle of the 1990-s) concerning the role of the economic elite in a society in transition. It is used as well as a ground for careful monitoring of trends over time. The role of the economic elite is compared between private and state institutions. The rich empirical material contributes to an understanding of the differentiated influences of the elite on the stability of the economic institutions. As empirical data on the economic elite of Hungary and Yugoslavia are available, the different patterns of the economic elite behaviour in Bulgaria and the other countries are compared. This proposes a comparative eastern dimension of the establishment of the elite in transitional economies. The international comparison allows to differentiate the general and the specific trends of adaptation, survival and crisis of the economic elite in time of significant transformation. Elites are key elements of societies in transition. Whether they are defined as 'top people' (highest participation in decision making process or in position) or people of highest reputation, their presence is decisive in most aspects of life. The chapter starts by outlining some of the major issues in studying the new elite groups, relating them to sociological theory of the role of authority and reproduction, social and self-identification, legality and legitimacy and value system changes. Then a description is proposed of some aspects of the reconstruction of the social processes of elite transformation in Bulgaria. A central focus in it is the adaptation, survival and crisis of the economic elite in a period of significant economic changes. A detailed empirical picture provides the grounds for identifying the leaders of the economic institutions and of their activities within the specific Bulgarian political, legal, economic and financial environment. In seeking to account for variations in patterns of economic establishment and functioning in the transition from command economy to capitalism, this part focuses particularly on explanations relating to the recruitment patterns, professional career and experience, educational qualification, attitudes, commitment, satisfaction, tactics, strategy, participation in the decision making process, personal and group loyalties. Each of these are seen to derive from distinctive cultural traditions and economic stages of development and the analyses seek to assess their relative explanatory merits. The relative importance of these factors is examined in different economic institutions - private and state, stable and in crisis. It explores the extent to which the influence of such factors is mediated by leaders, evidence is provided for the role of the leaders of the economic institutions and of the state administration in achieving/not achieving smooth adaptation of the economic system in the country. The main conclusions of the empirical sociological data can be summarised in several points. There is no long-term strategy and the approach of the elite to the liberalisation of the economic sector in the first half of the 1990s in Bulgaria is a chaotic one. The basic reasons are the lack of traditions, the underdevelopment of the economic system, the ups and downs in the domination role of the state. The financial branch is providing the quickest way of capital accumulation in the period of transition. The strategy is different in the state and the private institutions. There is a trend of capital flow from the state enterprises to the state banks and from the state financial institutions to the private ones. As a consequence, the transformation of the political power into an economic one after 1989 is being realised most intensively in the trade and financial sector. Hence, the elite component has a very significant impact on the crisis of the financial sphere in 1996. The lack of adequate qualification and professional experience, the predominance in the decision making considerations of personal and group interests are very important factors for the incapability of the economic elite in the first half of the 1990s to establish stable economic institutions in the country. In the final part of the chapter, it is revealed that the elite, as both a social category and an object of discourse, as a theoretical and practical concern, is not so much rooted in the political change in the post-socialist countries, but rather related to the marketisation of social relations and to its cultural acceptance and/or rejection by the different social groups. In this context an examination of the barriers - economic, political, cultural and symbolic, to the extraordinary power the elite exerts, is proposed. It is argued that in the process of producing and maintaining its power the elite develops and reproduces adequate institutions and functions. However, there are parallel culturally and economically adequate mechanisms for social response. Despite, these barriers are set rather by society than by the state. The thesis which is being presented in this part of the chapter is about the ambiguity of the place and the role of the state in a society in transformation. The state is not a universe which governs general welfare in the interest of all citizens. Its philosophy of double game - a unification with society against the elite and a unification with the elite against the society - reveals specific patterns of dictating behaviour. Thus the gulf between the state and the society does not disappear in the time of transition. In this sense, the state institutions are raising serious obstacles for society in its attempt to set rational barriers to the elite power. ------------------------------------------------------- <1> Excluded from the analysis are the representatives of the Party and state nomenklatura; they form a homogeneous group, apart from the mass of the intelligentsia, and should be considered a peculiar kind of elite. <2> The mentioned characteristics are based on Pierre Bourdieu's theory of kinds of capital of the separate social categories. Cf. Pierre Bourdieu (1979): La distinction. Critique sociale du jugement. Paris, Editions de Minuit. <3> Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1992), NSI, Sofia, p. 268. <4> The authors of the sociological survey on potential emigration of Bulgarian scientists quote data from the UNESCO Yearbook for 1988, showing that per 1 million population in Bulgaria there were 5 500 scientists, in Japan - 5 000, in USA - 3 200, in the former GFR, Sweden, Holland - under 3 000. Cf. The potential emigration of scientists in Bulgaria (Dynamics and perspectives) (1993), BAS, Institute of sociology, Sofia, p. 7. <5> Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1992), NSI, Sofia, , p. 261; Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1996), NSI, p. 305. <6> Ibid, p. 261; p. 305. <7> Ibid, p. 262; p. 306. <8> Ibid, p. 315; p. 310. <9> Ibid, p. 316; p. 311. <10> The number of state-supported post-graduate students studying in Bulgaria or sent abroad in 1995was 2,6 times less than in 1989. Ibid, p. 315; p. 310. Back to top |
